Developers are constantly seeking new and better ways to integrate strong security mechanisms into information systems. Classically, highly-secure information systems have been slow and clumsy at best. Researchers have long speculated that the integration of public key cryptography [l] into these networks could improve overall security without adding an unacceptable burden on users, developers, or administrators.
Recently, main-stream applications have begun to incorporate sophisticated public key cryptography features. Some examples include the popular families of World Wide Web browsers and servers by Netscape and Microsoft [2] [3] as well as security-enhanced messaging products that support the new Secure Multipurpose Internet Messaging Extensions (SMIME) [4].
Unfortunately, it can be argued that many of these applications simply shift the security and administration burden from the end user to the network administrator. Although this may be an appropriate shift in responsibility, it represents a new challenge to developers of modern information management networks. Many network administrators simply are not prepared to provide the services required of a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
The Project
The project that brought the PKI team together was the DOE Advanced Manufacturing / National Information Infrastructure (AMNII) effort. -1's primary goal was to develop advanced technologies that leverage the National Information Infrastructure to improve a variety of manufacturing processes within the DOE.
Early in this project, it became clear that participants wanted to leverage some new commercial products to accomplish their goals. The participants also saw the need to respect DOE'S traditional emphasis on security. Therefore, the overall goal of the A m 1 security team was to develop a security-enhanced manufacturing infrastructure using commercial products. The team's emphasis was to develop tools and techniques that could be used to protect unclassified information which all sites could safely share among themselves or with other trading partners.
The team also realized the need to leverage some of the new public key cryptography features in these products to deliver security solutions that did not create an unacceptable burden on their users. This led the team to the conclusion that AMNII would have to lead the development of a PIU within the US Department of Energy's Nuclear Weapons Complex.
The Players
The US Department of Energy's Nuclear Weapons Complex is rather unique in many respects:
Locations. The core complex consists of three laboratories and two production facilities: Sandia National Laboratories (Albuquerque, NM and Livermore, CA), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (Livermore, CA), Los Alamos National Laboratory (Los Alamos, NM), Allied Signal / Federal Manufacturing & Technologies (Kansas City, MO and Albuquerque, NM), and Lockheed Martin Energy Systems (Oak Ridge, TN). The complex also includes the Pantex assembly and storage facility (Amarillo, TX) and other operations.
Contractors: Each of these sites is operated for the DOE by various contractors representing divisions of some large diverse enterprises. The managing contractors include various divisions of Allied Signal Aerospace, the Lockheed Martin Corporation, the University of California, and others. Each of these operating contractors contributes a unique culture and perspective to their facilities.
Management: Oversight for these facilities is also provided by different DOE authorities and offices in Oakland CA, Albuquerque NM, and Washington DC.
Therefore, one of the early challenges for the AM/NII PIU team would be to accommodate the diversity of interests and stake holders represented throughout the complex.
The Process
The basic process that the team created for this project included five phases:
1. Survey. Survey each site to determine what PIU products and applications were already in use. The survey also gathered data that revealed certain requirements the new PIU must meet.
2. Design. Given the survey results, develop a basic system design that would meet most requirements.
3. Evaluate Products. Determine how well existing commercial products met the system's perceived requirements. The team was committed to finding a commercial solution rather than developing its own products.
4. Deploy. Given that a commercial solution would be acceptable, deploy that system to each site in the complex.
5. Evaluate. Continuously evaluate network performance and document both lessons learned and needed improvements.
Survey Results
The survey was conducted in the Spring and Summer of 1995 with the preliminary results presented in August 1995 [5] . This survey indicated that a variety of cryptographic products were used, but there were no clear leaders among these existing products. Most securityenhanced applications included electronic messaging, forms management, and other workflow applications.
These results lead the team to design a relativelysimple PKI to meet the following (non-inclusive) list of requirements:
The system should support both certificate hierarchies and cross-certification. The team felt that crosscertification of Certificate Authorities (CAS) provided the best performance and security for the complex. However, the team was concerned that the DOE would require a strictly-hierarchical PIU, so support for both hierarchical and cross-certified CAS was needed.
The CAS must be readily accessible over an open public network. The public network of choice was the Internet. This was somewhat of a departure for the team, because valuable DOE computing resources are not traditionally exposed to the global Internet.
The PIU should support products and applications currently used within the complex. At the time of the survey, the following products were seen as standards within the complex:
Netscape Navigator and the Netscape Commerce Server for hypertext applications.
1.
2.
3.
Oracle database management servers. X.500 for directory services. Most DOE sites had already made significant investments in X.500 technol- 
Product Evaluation
The team conducted a thorough product evaluation in parallel with the site surveys (Summer 1995 
*

Deployment
Based on the information gathered from the site surveys and product evaluation, the team selected Entrust for the AM/NII PKI.
Strengths
The Entrust product line was selected primarily because it exhibited the following perceived strengths:
Emphasis on automated key management -Entrust manages a full range of key management services, including (but not limited to): distribution, destruction, and revocation. The product normally performs these services when appropriate without user or manager intervention.
Seamless key archive and recovery -Entrust also performs automatic key backup, recovery, and archive. This avoids some of the problems associated with verifying signatures on documents after the private key used to sign the document has either expired or been revoked. This feature may also satisfy future US government requirements to support a key escrow or key recovery infrastructure.
Separate keys for signing and encrypting -Entrust uses separate key pairs for both signing and encrypting documents. This feature gives the manager the capability to backup or store the private encryption key without storing and thus risking the security of the private signature key.
Algorithm flexibility -Entrust also allows the user and manager to choose among a variety of cryptographic algorithms for both signing and encrypting documents.
Toolkits for custom applications -Entrust provides a series of tool kits (APIs) so that encryption and digital signature services can be embedded into custom software applications.
Support for U.S. Government Cryptographic Standards -Entrust was also able to deliver support for the Digital Signature Standard (DSS) [ 6 ] , the Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) 1181, and FIPS 140 [7] . This was important to the AM/NII team, because we expected to have meet these requirements to satisfy future DOE and U S . Government PKI requirements.
Weaknesses
Unfortunately, the Entrust product line is not perfect. It contains the following problematic features:
Licensing fees -The majority of the costs for deploying Entrust are incurred in license fees charged for each key pair issued by the system. These costs can be significant-as much as $100 per key pair. However, the exact cost for each key pair is negotiated as part of the price for each Entrust installation. So, this fee varies from site to site, even within the AMNII PKI. Entrust will be installed at the other AM/NII sites as resources and requirements dictate.
Certificate
Deployment Issues
One result of the deployment process is that the project team has identified many new issues that must be addressed to fully leverage the PKI. These issues, for the most part, have not yet been resolved in the AMNII PJU.
Identity verses authority -A certificate can certify the public key for a given user in the PKI, but it cannot normally convey the authority that the user's signature represents. For example, a certificate can certify the public key for "John Q. Public @ Acme Corporation", but it cannot tell the verifying party whether John Q. Public is signing as a staff member, manager, or procurement officer for the company. This problem is further complicated when one party delegates their signature authority to another party for some specific period of time. One solution to this problem would be to communicate this authority in an extension to the X.509 v3 certificate. However, this approach could be problematic, and the feature is not currently supported in Entrust.
Unique personal identifiers -It is essential that users be able to uniquely identify every user in the PKI. The most common or natural way to identify users is through their distinguished or common name. However, this technique is complicated by the fact that a large PKI will likely have some users with the same common name. Another logical personal identifier is a user's Social Security Number. However, the AMNII team did not want to make its users' Social Security Numbers readily available to anyone over the Internet. This situation is further complicated by the fact that some users do not commonly refer to themselves by their distinguished or legal names. All of these factors can make it difficult for a verifying party to retrieve a certificate from the PIU, even if the directory subsystem is properly configured.
Tracking personnel changes -It is important for the PKI to accurately reflect the employment status of users whose public keys are being certified. For example, if an employee is dismissed, it is important that the PKI reflect this by revoking that user's public key or some similar action. Ideally, the PKI would be tightly integrated with the organizations' human resources database. However, this level of integration can be difficult to achieve, although Entrust provides relatively seamless integration of these functions. It is even more difficult to insure that these changes are reflected in the PKI in a timely manner.
X.500 directory maintenance -Entrust relies on X.500 directory services to provide user certificates to verifying parties. This can require a great deal of local X.500 expertise, especially if the X.500 database is normally populated from systems other than the PKI. In some cases, a site's X.500 database had been setup and running without intervention or maintenance for a period of many months. When changes were indicated, the organization discovered that it had lost their X.500 expertise some time earlier.
Emergency access -Situations regularly arise when parties need to sign a document, but they are not in a convenient location to perform this function. In the paper paradigm, this is usually handled through a temporary delegation of authority. In the electronic paradigm, this can be more difficult. A similar situation occurs when an individual holds vital information that is stored in an encrypted format on their workstation. Although the Entrust management subsystem can provide emergency access to data, this feature is not designed for use on an everyday basis. Often, users compromise their pass phrases over the telephone to colleagues in order to satisfy these emergency requirements. A better solution to this problem is definitely needed.
Common trust models -It is also necessary for each CA in the PKI to accurately interpret the trust models for each of the cooperating CAS in the network. This is especially important where high-reliance certificates are offered by any of the CAS. The AM/NII team cooperated to develop a common trust model for the entire PKI. However, this may not be an option for other CAS in a given PKI. In addition, this approach may not work as private enterprises are added to the A M N I PKI.
Last summer, the DOE Chief Information Officer (CIO) chartered a Digital Signature Working Group at DOE/HQ. This group is currently working to establish a common PKI policy and trust model for the entire DOE. Several of the A M N I PKI developers are participants in this effort.
to address user questions and concerns, especially for those providing Help Desk services.
Emerging federal PKI -As the federal government embraces PKI technology, it is not clear how the A m 1 PKI might accommodate some of these emerging standards. For example, the current draft Federal PKI Specification [23] is modeled after the GCS-API [24] whereas Entrust conforms to the GSS-API [25] . In addition, it is not clear how the A m 1 PKI might accommodate other federal PKI efforts such as that underway by the United States Postal Service [26] .
Integration among infrastructures -It is essential that the PKI be integrated within an enterprise's intranet including systems such as an organization's human resources network. However, this may require integration with legacy applications and other dissimilar resources that could be problematic. Another troubling trend is that many sites now have many security infrastructures. Examples include the PKI, the Distributed Computing Environment (DCE) [27] , and Windows NT domains. Ideally, each of these security infrastructures would be integrated in a cooperative and complementary fashion. However, this appears to be one of the next substantive challenges in Information Security.
Other Issues and Impressions Next Steps
Support for hierarchies -The AM/NII PKI uses cross-certification among its CAS. However, the team has considered how it might accommodate hierarchical certification within the PKI. This is currently thought to be problematic, primarily because of the high level of effort required to verify some certificates in a hierarchical PIU. The team's current preference would be to cross-certify new CAS in the PIU rather than implement a classical PIU hierarchy.
Human factors -Human factors play an important role in a surprising number of PKI operations: Explaining PKI concepts -It can be difficult to explain some PKI concepts to management and staff who do not have a background in mathematics or cryptography. This can make the process of obtaining management concurrence on some PKI operations problematic.
User training -Users need to know when to sign or encrypt documents, and they need utilities that make these processes simple and intuitive. Some users may require training, whereas other users may need new applications software.
Installation and maintenance -PKI deployment requires support from knowledgeable staff who can properly install and maintain PIU components, especially at the desktop. Support staff may also need special training The AM/NII PKI project is proceeding, despite reductions in the original program. Additional work is indicated, depending on the availability of resources and priorities at each site.
Continued deployment -The goal remains to install Entrust at each of the A h 4 N I sites. Remaining sites include Lockheed Martin Energy Systems (Oak Ridge TN), and the Pantex facility (Amarillo TX). Other sites (Pacific Northwest National Laboratories and Savannah River Nuclear Facility) are also worlung to establish Entrust infrastructures.
Use in a Classified Environment -Entrust has been selected as the standard for digital signatures and encryption for the DOE SecureLab Network (SecureNet). In this application, the Entrust implementation of DES encryption (certified by NIST as compliant with HPS 140-A) is expected to provide need-to-know separation for classified information.
Wider applicability -The PIU has been successfully used in certain specific applications. Additional work is needed to extend the PKI to other enterprise information systems such as hypertext-based applications using World Wide Web technology. In addition, Entrust has not been widely deployed at some sites, simply because the support infrastructure is not in place to support a majority of possible users at those sites.
Application to new problems -The AMNII team has speculated that the PKI could be extended to address new and different problems. For example, the Entrust PKI could be more tightly integrated with certain database functions to give users easier access and developers better control over valuable corporate data.
Demonstrate compliance to new standards -Additional work is indicated to demonstrate that the AMNII PKI could be extended to satisfy certain new perceived standards such as the Federal PKI [23] and the S/MIME [4] messaging standard.
Summary
Security based on public key cryptography is only now becoming viable with the introduction of products that provide PKI services. Still, much of this technology can still be characterized as developmental. Deploying a PIU is based on much more than technology choices and product selection. There are few clear directions in this industry, and some new developments are still expected. Still, there are many advantages to deploying this technology.
